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Unequal at the Starting Line:
Creating Participatory Inequalities across
Generations and among Groups
SIDNEY VERBA, NANCY BURNS, AND KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN
We investigate how inequalities in political participation are shaped across generations by considering the
influence of family background—in particular, parents’ education and political involvement—on political
participation. We pursue this issue, first, for individuals, investigating the effects of parental characteristics
on the participatory profile of their offspring. Then, we use what we have learned to understand how group
differences in political participation—between women and men and among Latinos, African Americans,
and Anglo Whites—are rooted in the legacy of class and political background and in experiences through-
out the life cycle.
Americans are much more comfortable with inequalities of result when it comes to
economics than when it comes to politics. According to the American Dream, so long as
we are equal at the starting line, we expect and accept the inequalities of income and
wealth that result from individual differences in talent and industry. In contrast, we
expect not only that citizens possess equal rights on the level playing field of democracy
but that public officials will respond equally to all.1 Thus, while the transmission of
economic inequality across generations would constitute a violation of the ideology of
the American Dream, the transmission of political inequality across generations would
constitute a double infringement: transgressing not only the principle of equality of
opportunity but also the principle of equality of outcome among citizens.
That Americans are quite unequal in occupation and income is hardly news. Further-
more, it is well known that, contrary to the promise of the American Dream, we are not
equal at the starting line when it comes to occupational and economic success. Numer-
Sidney Verba is the Carl H. Pforzheimer University Professor at Harvard University and Director of the
Harvard University Library, Kay Lehman Schlozman is the J. Joseph Moakley Professor of Political Science at
Boston College, and Nancy Burns is the Henry Simmons Frieze Professor of Political Science at the University
of Michigan and Principal Investigator, American National Election Study. They are the co-authors of The
Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2001) which was the co-winner of the Victoria Schuck Award of the American Political Science Association for
the best book on gender and politics of its year.46 The American Sociologist / Spring/Summer 2003
ous sociological studies have established that the race does not start anew with each
generation: instead, parents are able to pass on class status to their offspring and, thus,
socio-economic stratification persists from generation to generation.2 Of course, as dem-
onstrated by SES differences between adult siblings, the transmission of socio-economic
status from parent to child is far from perfect. Nevertheless, the transmission of socio-
economic advantage across generations results in persistent class differences that have
roots in the past.
What about in politics? Contrary to Americans’ normative commitment to political equal-
ity is the well-established fact of political inequality among citizens: individuals and social
groups differ significantly in the extent to which they take part in political life, and these
differences have consequences for who gets what from the government. Systematic research
has demonstrated over and over the strong links between socio-economic status—occupa-
tion, income and, especially, education—and citizen political participation.3 The associa-
tion between SES and political activity has ramifications for disparities in participation
among other politically relevant groups. The participatory differences among racial and
ethnic groups can be fully explained—and the participation gap between men and women
can be partially explained—by group differences in SES.4
The Legacy of the Family for Political Participation
Are political inequalities, like economic inequalities, bequeathed from one generation to
the next? When, as it did in 2000, a presidential contest pits the son of a former senator
against the son of a former president, it is hard to doubt that family inheritance plays a role
in the achievement of elite political status. Do analogous processes operate for ordinary
citizens? Are the children of politically active parents more likely to be active than are those
from less active families? In this paper, we focus on the largely unstudied issue of the persis-
tence of inequality in political activity and its roots in processes of intergenerational trans-
mission.
In explaining participation, political scientists currently tend to focus on proximate
causes—in particular, the characteristics of individuals and the nature of their political and
social contexts. At one point in the past, however, political scientists paid a great deal of
attention to the potential influence of early experience on the political behavior of adults.
However, the concern with the legacy of the past intrinsic to studies of political socialization
was soon eclipsed, in part because of the difficulty in drawing inferences for the political
commitments and behavior of adults from studies, even sophisticated and well-designed
studies, of children.5
Both the inheritance bequeathed by the family and the significance of various family
characteristics—among them, social class—figure importantly in this earlier literature.6 In
spite of the focus on the consequences for adult citizens of the social class of the family of
origin, however, the emphases in the early socialization studies do not speak directly to our
concerns. First, the legacy of the family is framed mostly in terms of the substance of poli-
tics: the absorption of political information and political orientations—in particular, party
identification—at home.7 In addition, extensive social class differences in children’s politi-
cal information and orientations are explained in terms of subcultural differences between
SES groups with respect to such aspects of family dynamics as the autonomy permitted to
children, the relative emphasis placed on obedience, and the encouragement of discussion
of controversial matters.8 From these social class differences in family life and child-rearing
patterns, inferences are drawn about the presumed future capacity to take part in politics.Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 47
While it is quite reasonable to expect that children and adolescents who are encouraged
to be independent and to contribute to family discussions will develop into active citi-
zens, the lack of attention to the income and educational advantages that accrue to
those who grow up in high-SES families, and the future participatory payoff of those
income and educational advantages, is noteworthy.9
In this paper we link two well-known regularities—the transmission of SES from genera-
tion to generation and the significance of SES for political activity—to demonstrate an
alternative mechanism by which the family of origin leaves a legacy for the political partici-
pation of future citizens. Thus, parents who are advantaged in SES terms—who have higher
levels of education, income, and occupational status—pass on those socio-economic advan-
tages to their offspring which are, in turn, translated into political activity in the next gen-
eration. Because it is the single most substantial and most multi-faceted influence on politi-
cal activity, we focus on education as the primary vehicle by which socio-economic status
acts to transmit political activity across generations. Not only does education have a direct
impact on political participation but level of education affects the acquisition of nearly all
the other factors that facilitate participation: the well-educated are more likely to earn high
incomes on the job; to develop civic skills at work, in non-political organizations and, to a
lesser extent, in church; to be in social networks through which requests for political activity
are mediated; and to be politically interested and knowledgeable.10
We consider as well another mechanism by which parents might influence the participa-
tion of their offspring, a political path. Just as parents can enrich their children financially by
leaving them money, so can politically active parents leave a legacy of political involvement
to their children by exposing them to politics. A politically rich home environment—in
which politically active parents act as role models and children are exposed to political
discussions and other political stimuli—fosters later political involvement. Because well-
educated parents are likely also to be politically active, the SES and political paths are con-
nected.
In addition, we expect that the legacy of parents’ education operates in other ways about
which, because we use recall data collected from adults, we were unable to ask. For example,
all things equal, having parents who were politically and socially well connected or who
filled the house with books, newspapers, and periodicals would, presumably, have conse-
quences for future political participation. Moreover, unmeasured aspects of child-rearing
that are discussed in the earlier literature on socialization—for example, emphasis on obedience
or encouragement of autonomy and independence—might influence future political activity.
We will show that these two processes of intergenerational transmission of political activ-
ity—as the direct result of coming of age in a politically stimulating environment or as the
indirect result of the transmission of socio-economic status across generations—operate,
separately and in interaction one with the other. The distinction between the two processes
is important for our understanding not only of the sources of political action but also of the
way political inequalities might be ameliorated or exacerbated by changes in the distribu-
tion of income and education or by changes in politics itself.
Politics is not just about individuals; it is also about groups. Political competition usually
involves contention between groups and the outcomes usually impose costs and confer ben-
efits on groups. Hence, it matters not only whether some individuals inherit advantages for
future political involvement from their parents, but also whether these intergenerational
processes result in participatory inequalities across politically-relevant categories of individu-
als.11 Thus, we expand our analysis of the way in which political participation is shaped
by parents’ SES and political characteristics to focus on the roots of group differences in48 The American Sociologist / Spring/Summer 2003
political participation in the legacy of the past. In considering how participatory inequalities
among groups are shaped across generations, we consider three bases of political contes-
tation—perhaps the significant bases of contestation in America—class, race or ethnicity,
and gender. That is, we ask: to what extent are class, racial or ethnic, and gender differ-
ences in political activity the result of where group members were early in life?
From Generation to Generation: Participation and Education
We begin our analysis with basic bivariate data.12 To begin with, there is a statisti-
cally significant relationship between respondents’ political activity as adults and their
reports about the political environment at home when they were adolescents—whether
their mothers and fathers were politically active and whether there was political discus-
sion at home.13 If we stratify respondents on the basis of the political richness of the
home environment, we find that 43 percent of respondents in the bottom quartile on
the home political environment scale undertake some political activity other than vot-
ing in contrast to 69 percent of the respondents in the top quartile of the scale. Al-
though these data do not establish why, they make clear that the politically richer the
home environment, the more likely an adult is to undertake some political activity
other than voting.14 This relationship is even more dramatic when we consider the
volume of activity rather than the proportion of respondents who undertook some activ-
ity other than voting. The vote is unique among political acts in that there is mandated
equality in political input: we each get only one. In contrast, for other kinds of activity,
those who have the will and the wherewithal can multiply their political input. Using
dollars and hours as the metric, we found that the 28 percent of respondents in the
lowest category in terms of home political environment produce only 10 percent of
total hours given to politics and 5 percent of the total dollars contributed to political
campaigns and causes. In contrast, the 22 percent of respondents in the top category in
terms of home political environment produce 40 percent of total hours and 55 percent
of the total dollars.
While politically active parents are more likely to have politically active children, well-
educated parents are even more likely to have well-educated children. Those whose parents
were in the top quartile of education are nearly three times as likely to be high school
graduates as are those whose parents were in the bottom quartile.15 In light of the relation-
ship between education and political activity, we need to complete the circle by considering
the relationship between respondents’ exposure to political stimuli as an adolescent and
their parents’ educational attainment. Well-educated parents are more likely to provide a
rich political environment. Compared to respondents whose parents were in the lowest
educational group, respondents whose parents were in the top educational group are more
than twice as likely to have had parents in the top quartile with respect to the richness of the
political environment they provided.16
In order to understand the processes by which intergenerational transmission shapes
political activity, we turn to multivariate analysis. Table 1, which presents an OLS regres-
sion predicting scores on an eight-point scale summarizing the number of political activities
the respondent has undertaken, contains several kinds of explanatory variables. First are
measures of characteristics at birth: gender, race or ethnicity, and parents’ education. Next
are two factors that reflect experiences while growing up: the respondent’s own education
and exposure to politics at home, both of which are consequences, in part, of parents’ edu-
cation. In addition are four measures of participatory factors acquired in adulthood: family
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litical activity originating in the major non-political institutions of adult life—the work-
place, non-political organizations, and religious institutions—factors that, as we shall
see, are influenced by parents’ education.17 Table 1 begins to demonstrate how the
consequences of parental education influence political participation. The factors that
result directly from parental education, respondent’s education and politics at home,
matter a good deal. Likewise, the factors that, we shall see, come more indirectly from
parents’ education—family income and civic skills developed in and requests for activity
originating in adult institutions—are also significant.18 Thus, these data offer evidence
that political participation is transmitted from generation to generation.
In Table 2 we elaborate the multiple processes through which parental education affects
the respondent’s political participation by showing the paths by which intergenerational
transmission operates.19 For the sample as a whole, the average number of political acts is
2.11. As shown in the table, about one quarter of the average person’s level of activity (.53 of
those 2.11 acts) derives from the various effects of parental education. While the nature of
Table 1
Predicting Political Activity
Ordinary Least Squares Regressiona
Coefficient
Explanatory Variable (s.e.)
Parents’ Education .61***
(.18)
DIRECT CONSEQUENCES OF PARENTS’ EDUCATION
Respondent’s Education 1.32***
(.12)
Politics at Home .82***
(.14)
RESOURCES GATHERED LATER IN LIFE
Family Income 2.22***
(.31)
Respondent’s Own Earnings -.43
(.39)
Civic Skills 1.47***
(.16)
Recruitment 2.07***
(.19)
GENDER, RACE, AND ETHNICITY
Woman -.19***
(.06)
Black .03
(.09)
Latino -.20
(.12)
N 2517
a The equation also includes age, age over 65, and a constant term.
* Coefficient significant at p<.05.
** Coefficient significant at p<.01.
*** Coefficient significant at p<.001.50 The American Sociologist / Spring/Summer 2003
our sample and the uncertainty in the measures of the explanatory and the dependent
variables imply that we should not overestimate the specificity of that particular num-
ber (or any other number in the table), its magnitude is worth noting. While political
activity is not fully determined at birth, a significant portion is transmitted from gen-
eration to generation. That family background is not the whole story is hardly surpris-
ing. Sibling studies have long demonstrated the variation in adult behavior even among
those who share genes and environment. Nevertheless, family background exercises an
important influence on adult political activity.
Considering these data more closely, we see that one part of the effect of parents’ educa-
tion on activity—a little over one-tenth of the overall impact—is explicitly political. Well-
educated parents tend to provide a rich political environment at home, and respondents
who have been exposed to politics at home while growing up are more politically active as
adults.20 Even more substantial than the impact of the political environment at home, how-
ever, are the effects of socio-economic processes. The single most important of these pro-
cesses derives from the expected strong relationship between parents’ education and that of
their offspring and the consequences, in turn, of respondent’s education for political par-
ticipation. In addition, parents’ education influences the respondent’s political participa-
tion through its consequences for subsequent life experiences outside politics: family in-
come and civic skills exercised and requests for activity in non-political institutions—on the
job, in non-political organizations, and at church. Lastly, additional processes that cannot
be specified with any precision account for roughly one-quarter of the effect of parental
education on political activity.21 These estimates of parental effects are not insubstantial in
light of the number of other variables included in the analysis.
In data not shown, we took the analysis one step further. For the eight-point scale measur-
ing overall political activity, we substituted two measures of the volume of participation: the
amount of time donated to political activity; and the amount of money donated to cam-
paigns and other political causes. Our results reinforce the understanding that there are two
different mechanisms of intergenerational transmission. The impact of parents’ education
that runs through its influence on the political environment at home is manifest for the
number of hours given to politics, but not for the number of dollars. That is, growing up in
a politically stimulating home enhances the future propensity to give time to politics, but
has no effect when it comes to giving money. For making political contributions, the single
Table 2
How Much Participation Comes from the Effects of Parents’ Education?
Consequence
Effects through political stimuli
Politics at home .06 act
Effects through socio-economic processes
Respondent’s education .20 act
Family income .06 act .34 act
Civic skills .06 act
Recruitment .02 act
Additional effects of parents’ education
on participatory acts .13 act
Total effect of parents’ education .53 act
(or 25% of the average number of acts, 2.11)Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 51
most important factor is family income, and parents’ education has direct consequences for
family income—above and beyond its effect on respondents’ education.22 Thus, these
data strengthen our conclusion that, when it comes to political activity, we are not equal
at the starting line. Instead, parents’ educational attainment reaches across generations
to influence in many ways the political participation of their offspring.
It is interesting to compare the effect of parental education on the intergenerational
transmission of political activity with the effect of parental education on the transmission of
socio-economic status (as measured by income). In Table 3 we present OLS regressions that
permit us to compare the factors that predict (as in Table 1) respondents’ political activity as
well as their income from their jobs. We focus exclusively on the employed and change the
specification somewhat from that used in Table 1. Since they derive in part from the jobs
that produce the individual’s income, we omit family income, skills, and recruitment as
independent variables. Because the number of hours worked is strongly related to income
from a job, we add it to the independent variables. Considering the parental legacy, we see
that, as expected, parental education is significantly related both to respondent’s political
activity and to respondent’s job income. A stimulating political environment at home as a
teenager, however, has consequences for later political activity, but not for later job income.
These data lend credibility to the fact that there is a politics-specific intergenerational connec-
Table 3
Activity and Income: Intergenerational Transmission
Ordinary Least Squares Regressiona
Predicting Predicting
Political Activity Respondent’s Income (Logged)
Coefficient Coefficient
Explanatory Variable (s.e.) (s.e.)
Parents’ Education .10** .20***
(.04) (.06)
DIRECT CONSEQUENCES OF PARENTS’ EDUCATION
Respondent’s Education .40*** .60***
(.03) (.05)
Politics at Home .15*** .01
(.03) (.05)
CONTROLLING FOR
Hours of Employment .09* 1.26***
(.04) (.06)
GENDER, RACE, AND ETHNICITY
Woman -.03* -.22***
(.01)  (.02)
Black .00 -.08*
(.02) (.03)
Latino -.05* -.05
(.02) (.04)
N 2517 2517
a The equation also includes age, age over 65, and a constant term.
* Coefficient significant at p<.05.
** Coefficient significant at p<.01.
*** Coefficient significant at p<.001.52 The American Sociologist / Spring/Summer 2003
tion that links a politically rich home environment to later political involvement but
not to subsequent job success.
Since the metrics are different, we must be cautious in comparing the processes of
transmission of political participation and economic success across the generations. It
seems, however, that parents’ education plays a bigger role in shaping their children’s
job income than their political activity. Still, the striking finding in Table 3 is the overall
resemblance between political activity and income with respect to the influence of a
parental legacy. Equality of opportunity obtains for neither politics nor markets. In
neither domain is there equality at the starting line. The characteristics of parents—
their education when it comes to income, their education and political involvement
when it comes to political activity—give some a head start.
Class Background and Group Differences
When individual inequalities in political participation aggregate in such a way as to
produce disparities in activity among politically relevant groups, the inequalities in
political activity are especially consequential. There are, in fact, group differences in
political activity as measured by the eight-point participation scale with men somewhat
more active than women and Anglo Whites somewhat more active than African Ameri-
cans and considerably more active than Latinos.23 We now seek to extend our explora-
tion by assessing the extent to which such group differences in participation have their
roots in these processes of intergenerational transmission.24 Education is, once again,
crucial to our argument, and we focus on education as we consider the way in which
group differences in early experiences create inequalities across groups in political activ-
ity. The various transmission paths from parental education to political activity are the
same as those outlined for the individual effects, but there are additional considerations
in dealing with group differences.
The Transmission of Education across Generations: An Outcomes Analysis
For a fuller understanding of the several possible processes of transmission from generation
to generation that might operate to create group differences in participation, we build on
and extend our earlier analyses by turning to an “outcomes” analysis.25 Our approach re-
quires attention to several features of the process that links early experiences to group differ-
ences in adult political activity. We begin by differentiating between the level and effect of
various factors that facilitate political activity. By level, we refer to the average amount of a
participatory factor commanded by members of a group. For a human attribute that we
would expect to have no relationship to political participation—say, physical strength—a
group difference in the attribute, even if substantial, would have no participatory conse-
quence. For factors known to be strongly associated with political participation—say, family
income—a group difference in the level of the attribute would be crucial. Given our concern
with processes of intergenerational transmission, we shall be concerned, in particular, with
disparities among groups in the average level of parental education and in the level of home
political stimulation. With respect to effect, we refer to the extent of the boost given to the
dependent variable, in this case political activity, by a given change in a particular factor.
There is no reason to assume that the effects of participatory factors are uniform across
groups. To illustrate the possibility of group-based differences in rates of conversion, consider
an extreme example, African Americans in the South under segregation. Because Blacks
were prevented by law, custom, and violence from voting or otherwise taking part inVerba, Burns, and Schlozman 53
politics, the relationship between education and participation in the Jim Crow South
must have been very different for Blacks and Whites.
We start our consideration of this analytical chain by examining, for the two genera-
tions, levels of education and political activity within each of five groups: two gender
groups and three groups defined by their race or ethnicity, Anglo Whites, African Ameri-
cans, and Latinos. With respect to education, Table 4 shows two distinct patterns. Since
boys and girls are born more or less randomly into families, there is no real difference in
the educational attainment of the parents of the men and women in the sample.26
Nevertheless, whether because they had more limited educational aspirations or be-
cause they received more limited support and encouragement from their parents and
teachers, women end up, on average, somewhat less well-educated than men are. With
respect to race or ethnicity, the pattern is quite different. African Americans and Latinos
begin with an educational deficit, which is then reproduced.27 That is, the parents of
Anglo White respondents in our sample have relatively high levels of educational attain-
ment as do the Anglo-White respondents themselves. The contrast between the two sets
of groups is noteworthy. While the gender gap in education is created during men’s and
women’s lifetimes, educational disparities among groups defined by their race or ethnicity
have intergenerational origins.
We should pause to note that these data, which are for the adult population, represent the
accumulation of previous decades of disparities among groups in educational attainment and
do not allow us to extrapolate into the future. Among younger cohorts there has been a
diminution of the education gap between women and men and between African Americans
and Anglo Whites, though not between Latinos and Anglo Whites. Women, whose rates of
high school graduation have long compared favorably to men’s, are now more likely to
graduate from college than men are. Among 25-to-29 year olds, the ratio of the percentage
of African-Americans with a high school diploma to the percentage of Whites with a high
school diploma was .30 in 1940, .66 in 1974, and .93 in 2000.28 In contrast, the ratio of
Latino to Anglo White high school graduation percentages has diminished in recent de-
cades; in 1974, it was .67; in 2000, it was .59.29 Thus, as time goes by, we would expect a
decrease in the disparity between Anglo Whites and African Americans—but not neces-
sarily between Anglo Whites and Latinos—in the parental educational circumstances in
which children come of age.
Table 4
Educational Attainment and Political Involvement across the Generationsa
Anglo
Men Women Whites Blacks Latinos
A. EDUCATION
Parents’ education .23 .22 .23 .16b .13b
Respondent’s education .42 .38c .41 .34b .29b
B. POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Parents’ political involvementd .24 .24 .25 .23 .16b
Respondent’s political activity .33 .28c .32 .27b .17b
a All variables have been rescored to take on values from 0 to 1.
b Significantly different from Anglo Whites at p < .01.
c Significantly different from men at p < .01.
d Average score on a scale including mother’s political activity, father’s political activity, and political discussions at home (all
measured at age 16).54 The American Sociologist / Spring/Summer 2003
Table 4B presents information for these groups about the other aspect of the legacy of
early home life, exposure to political stimuli. It tells a similar story. With respect to
political exposure, there is no appreciable difference between the homes in which girls
and boys come of age.30 In contrast, there are racial and ethnic differences in the political
richness of the home environment. Anglo Whites are considerably more likely than
Latinos and slightly, though not significantly, more likely than Blacks to grow up in a
politically stimulating home.
Calculating Outcomes Based on Level and Effect
We now undertake what we call an “outcomes analysis” to demonstrate the processes by
which group differences in levels of parental endowments and the effects of parental endow-
ments create group differences in political participation. To take possible differences in effect
into account, we analyze the processes of transmission separately for each of the groups.
Though we conduct our analyses separately for each group, we present the results of those
analyses in terms of the extent to which the process in question augments or diminishes
group differences in the relevant outcome. Since there are multiple processes, the analysis
proceeds in stages. As discussed earlier, parents’ education has an impact on respondent’s
political activity through a socio-economic path and through a political path, each of which
needs to be considered. By the end we are able to summarize how various transmission
processes work together to influence participatory inequalities between women and men,
between Anglo Whites and African Americans, and between Anglo Whites and Latinos.
Table 5A reports data on the implications of group differences in both level and effect for
the first stage of a chain that leads to group differences in political activity: the linkage
between group differences in parental education and respondent’s education. The table con-
tains a lot of numbers. Let us pause to explain how to read the table. The first row of Table 5A
repeats numbers from Table 4 and shows the average level of parents’ education for the
groups we are comparing.31 We report, as well, whether these levels are statistically different
from one another. As mentioned, men and women do not differ significantly in the age-
adjusted education of their parents. However, Anglo Whites do differ significantly from
Blacks and from Latinos with respect to parents’ educational background.
The second row of numbers contains the unstandardized regression coefficients from OLS
regression equations, conducted separately for each group, that predict the respondent’s
education.32 These coefficients measure the effect on respondent’s education of moving from
the lowest to the highest category of the parental education scale. For each group, the impact
of parents’ education on that of their offspring is substantial. Moreover, the effect is statisti-
cally uniform across groups: there are no significant group differences in the magnitude of
that impact.33
The next set of numbers shows the “outcome,” the overall impact of parents’ education on
respondents’ education. For each group, we calculate the outcome as the product of the
amount of parental education (from the first row of numbers) and its effect on respondents’
education (from the second row of numbers).34 We report the difference in outcomes be-
tween the relevant pairs of groups (between men and women, between Anglo Whites and
Blacks, and between Anglo Whites and Latinos) in the last row. These numbers capture the
extent to which group differences in the levels and/or effects of parents’ education contribute
to disparities between groups in respondent’s education. The positive entries in the cells
indicate that parents’ education widens the gap between groups in respondent’s education.
Notice that, in the first pair of columns, parents’ education does not help to explain
the gender gap in educational attainment. Although parental education is a significantVerba, Burns, and Schlozman 55
predictor of respondent’s education for both women and men, there are no significant
gender differences either in the average amount of parental education or in the impact
of parental education on respondent’s education. Hence, while the men in the sample
are, on average, better educated than the women are, parental education plays no role in
creating that educational difference. In contrast, disparities in parents’ education do
account for some of the educational differences between African Americans and Anglo
Whites and, especially, between Latinos and Anglo Whites. In short, adult women,
Blacks, and Latinos are all disadvantaged with respect to the single most important
participatory factor, educational attainment; however, for the latter two groups the defi-
cit has its origins, at least in part, in the lower levels of educational attainment within
the previous generation while for women its sources are elsewhere.
Table 5B, which reports a parallel analysis for the effect of parental education on the
likelihood that the respondent was exposed to political stimuli at home, contains analogous
results. Once again, parental education has an impact, in this case, on political exposure.
And, once again, the effect results from significant group differences in parents’ education,
rather than from any significant differences among groups in the magnitude of the impact
Table 5
A. The Consequences of Parents’ Education for Respondent’s Education: An Outcomes Analysis
Anglo African
Men Women Whites Americans Latinos
Average level of parents’ education .23 .22 .23 .16a .13a
Coefficient on parents’ education .71*** .70*** .71*** .60*** .75***
Overall outcome for group .16 .16 .15 (.17)b .11 .09
Between Men Between Anglo Whites and:
and Women African Americans Latinos
Consequences for gap between groups in education
Differences between groups in outcomes 0 .04 .08
B. The Consequences of Parents’ Education for Politics at Home: An Outcomes Analysis
Anglo African
Men Women Whites Americans Latinos
Average level of parents’ education .23 .22 .23 .16a .13a
Coefficient on parents’ education .31*** .34*** .32*** .38*** .37***
Overall impact for group .08 .08 .08 .06 .05
Between Men Between Anglo Whites and:
and Women African Americans Latinos
Consequences for gap between groups in politics at home
Differences between groups in outcomes 0 .02 .03
Separate equations for women, men, Anglo Whites, African Americans, and Latinos, with age, age over 65, gender, race,
and ethnicity in the equation. See Appendix A for parallel analyses using interaction terms.
* Coefficient significant at p<.05.
** Coefficient significant at p<.01.
*** Coefficient significant at p<.001.
a Significantly different from Anglo Whites at p < .01.
b .15 is calculated using the average coefficient for Anglo Whites and African Americans; .17 is calculated using the average
coefficient for Anglo Whites and Latinos.56 The American Sociologist / Spring/Summer 2003
of parental education. Group differences in parents’ education explain, in part, the
differences in the exposure to politics at home African Americans and Anglo Whites and
between Latinos and Anglo Whites.
The Acquisition of Other Participatory Factors
The next step is to assess the impact of parental education on several key participa-
tory factors: family income, civic skills, and requests for political activity. These partici-
patory factors originate in adult institutions—the workplace, non-political organiza-
tions, and religious institutions. Parental education can affect the acquisition of these
factors in either or both of two ways. First, those whose parents are well educated might
be better positioned to acquire such factors. Such a direct effect would be indicated by
a significant coefficient for parents’ education on one or more of these participatory
factors, even with the intermediate step of the respondent’s own education taken into
account. Second, we know that respondents whose parents are well educated are likely
to be well educated themselves, and well-educated respondents are more likely to be
able to stockpile these participatory factors.
The top section of Table 6, which examines various paths through which disparities in
participatory factors are created, shows, for each of the groups, the effects of parental educa-
tion on the acquisition of participatory factors—through its impact on respondent’s educa-
tion. We calculate these effects of parents’ education by combining the coefficients for par-
ents’ education on respondent’s education and the levels of parents’ education (shown in
Table 5A) with the coefficients for respondent’s education from group-specific OLS regres-
sions predicting the various participatory factors.35 Although parents’ education has an im-
pact on respondent’s education, and respondent’s education, in turn, has an impact on civic
skills, recruitment to political activity, and family income, when these effects are multiplied
together, the result is only a moderate impact on the disparities between groups in participa-
tory factors. Not surprisingly, there are no effects on the gender difference in participatory
factors. The gap between groups in parents education has a mixed and limited effect on
Table 6
The Effects of Parents’ Education on Inequality in Participatory Factorsa
Between Men Between Anglo Whites Between Anglo
and Women and African Americans Whites and Latinos
Effects of parents’ education through
respondent’s education and politics at
home on the gap in the acquisition of:
Civic skills 0 +.01 +.04
Recruitment 0 -.01 -.01
Family income 0 0 +.01
Additional effects of parents’ education
on the gap in the acquisition of:
Civic skills 0 0 0
Recruitment +.02 0 0
Family income 0 0 0
a Positive entries indicate that parents’ education has the effect of widening the gap between the groups; negative entries
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the disparity in such factors between African Americans and Anglo Whites—a small
gain for Anglo Whites over Blacks in civic skills counterbalanced by a small gain for
Blacks over Whites in recruitment. The most pronounced impact is the advantage in
participatory factors accruing to Anglo Whites vis-à-vis Latinos, largely as the result of
the additional civic skills the former develop by virtue of the impact of their parents’
education on their own education. As shown in the bottom portion of Table 6, there are
almost no additional effects of parental education—that is, through paths not consid-
ered here—on group differences in the acquisition of these participatory factors.36
Parents’ Education and Political Activity: Summing the Effects
We are now in a position to combine these analyses in a summary measure of the
effect of parental education on participatory inequality. Adopting an approach analo-
gous to that used to estimate the various effects of parental education on the acquisition
of participatory factors, we present data in Table 7 summarizing the implications of
group differences in parents’ education for disparities in participation between women
and men, between Anglo Whites and Blacks, and between Anglo Whites and Latinos.37
The intergenerational impact of parental education has almost no role in the creation of
gender differences in participation. It has only a modest indirect effect through adult insti-
tutions and no additional effects. In contrast, group differences in parents’ education have,
not unexpectedly, much more substantial consequences for participatory inequalities among
Latinos, African Americans, and Anglo Whites. For both Blacks and Latinos, group differ-
ences in parental education play an important role in creating a participation gap with
Anglo Whites. In both cases the effects that operate through the impact of parents’
education on respondent’s education are matched by additional effects of roughly equal
magnitude. These effects are even more substantial for Latinos than for African Ameri-
cans. However, since the disparity in activity between Anglo Whites and Latinos is more
than three times as large as that between Anglo Whites and Blacks, the impact of par-
ents’ education on political activity accounts for a smaller proportion of the participa-
tion gap for Latinos than it does for Blacks.38
Table 7
The Effects of Parents’ Education on the Gap in Number of Political Acts
Between Men Between Anglo-Whites Between Anglo-
and Women and African Americans Whites and Latinos
Effects of parents’ education
on the gap in participation through:
Respondent’s education .00 .06 .09
Politics at home .00 .07 .07
Family income .004 .02 .04
Adult institutions .03 .00 .04
Additional effects of parents’ education
on the gap in participation .00 .17 .17
Total effects of parents’ education
on the gap in participation .034 .32 .41
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In short, while processes of intergenerational transmission operate across the board to
create participatory inequalities among individuals, the implications of these processes in
creating participatory inequalities among groups are quite different for gender than for race
or ethnicity. Because boys and girls do not differ systematically in the education of their
parents, processes of intergenerational transmission play almost no role in explaining why
men are somewhat more politically active than women.39 In contrast, these process are crucial in
explaining the participatory gap between Anglo Whites and Latinos or African Americans.
Conclusion
We began this paper by noting the contrasting interpretations that Americans bring
to economic and political equalities. In the economic domain, so long as we compete on
an equal footing, we expect that the fleet and the tenacious will fare better, and we
accept massive inequalities of wealth and income. We are more egalitarian with respect
to the political arena—believing that the promise of democracy is equal responsiveness
to all citizens.
This paper has elucidated the extent to which these abstract principles are transgressed
by the realities of economic and political life. Neither domain is characterized by equality of
condition: we are unequal with respect to both income and, in violation of the commitment
to the level playing field of democracy, political participation. Moreover, contrary to the
promise of the American Dream, in neither domain does equality of opportunity obtain:
the transmission of class advantage across generations implies that we are not even equal at
the starting line. We have seen that in politics, just as in economics, the driving force behind
intergenerational transmission of inequality is parents’ education. Parental education has a
potent impact on political activity because well-educated parents are more likely both to
provide a politically rich environment and to have children who become well-educated,
affluent adults. In turn, well-educated offspring are likely to be better off with respect to
nearly every other participatory factor: to have challenging and financially rewarding jobs,
to develop civic skills and to receive requests for participation in non-political institutions,
to be politically informed and interested, and so on.40 Thus we have added to our under-
standing of the origins of political participation. Most of the proximate causes of political
participation have their roots, at least in part, in social class background.
The processes by which initial class background influences subsequent political activity
operate across individuals regardless of their other demographic characteristics. When we
explored how these processes intersect with participatory inequalities among groups—be-
tween women and men and among African Americans, Latinos, and Anglo Whites—we
found a complex and interesting pattern. On the one hand, there are no significant differ-
ences across groups defined by their gender or by their race or ethnicity in the way that the
legacy of class origin is translated into political participation. That is, the effect of SES
background on adult political activity does not vary either with gender or with race or
ethnicity.
On the other hand, the intergenerational transmission of educational advantage plays
a very different role in the creation of disparities in activity between groups defined by
their gender than in the creation of participatory differences among groups defined by
race or ethnicity. The gender gap in political participation is not a function of initial class
differences. Men and women are born randomly into families across the SES spectrum. That
men’s average levels of educational attainment have traditionally surpassed women’s reflects
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systematic difference in parents’ education. The educational disparity between women
and men is one of several factors—including men’s advantage with respect to the kinds
of jobs that provide civic skills and requests for political activity and the disproportion-
ate representation of men among political leaders suggesting that politics is a man’s
world—that explain why men are somewhat more active in politics than women are.41
In sharp contrast, group differences in parents’ education figure importantly in ex-
plaining participatory inequalities among Anglo Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. Class back-
ground plays a role from the beginning in the family of origin. Yet we must hasten to
add that, in asserting that social class is the key to racial and ethnic differences in
participation, we are not in any way claiming that race or ethnicity is irrelevant. On the
contrary, class differences along racial or ethnic lines reflect the results of processes of
discrimination that have everything to do with racial or ethnic status. It is hardly a
coincidence that there are SES differences among racial and ethnic groups and that
these racial and ethnic disparities in class background persist across generations. Thus,
our argument depends not on distinguishing race or ethnicity, on the one hand, from
class, on the other, but rather on the ways that these are inextricably mixed. Still, it is
worth noting that, for African Americans and Latinos, the deficit in participation is
handed down from generation to generation; for women, it is created anew throughout
the life cycle.
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Notes
1. On these themes, see Hochschild (1981, esp. chap. 6); McClosky and Zaller (1984, esp. chap. 3); and
Verba and Orren (1985, chaps. 1, 8, and 9).
2. See, for example, Blau and Duncan (1967); Hauser and Featherman (1977); Hout, (1988); Ganzeboom,
Treiman, and Ultee (1991); Solon (1992); McMurrer and Sawhill (1998); and Smelser, Wilson, and
Mitchell (1999).
3. Among the analyses of political activity that demonstrate the connection between SES and political activ-
ity are Verba and Nie (1972); Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980); and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993). In
spite of its unambiguous empirical power, it is common to deride the “SES Model of Participation,” as
simplistic, apolitical, and atheoretical. See Leighley (1995, pp. 183–188) for a trenchant summary of the
criticisms of the SES model. For a more theoretical presentation that explains the linkage between socio-
economic status and activity, see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995).
4. On participatory differences among groups defined by their race or ethnicity, see, Verba and Nie (1972);
Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie (1993); Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995); Leighley and Vedlitz
(1999); and Leighley (2001). On the participation gap between women and men, see Andersen (1975);
Welch (1977); Beckwith (1986); and Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001).
5. In a review article written a third of a century ago, Jack Dennis (1968) was able to draw on an extensive
bibliography of works about political socialization. Nevertheless, before even two decades had passed,
Timothy Cook (1985, p. 1079) noted the decline in interest in political socialization remarking that “the
bull market has turned bearish.”
6. See, for example, Dawson and Prewitt (1969, chap. VII); and Jaros (1973, p. 80).
7. See, for example, Davies (1965); Greenstein (1965); Hess and Torney (1967); Easton and Dennis (1969);
Jaros (1973, pp. 84–85); Jennings and Niemi (1974); Jennings and Niemi (1981); and Beck and Jennings
(1991). Assessing the long series of political socialization studies that he and his associates have con-
ducted, M. Kent Jennings (2000) points to the emphasis on partisanship and political preferences rather60 The American Sociologist / Spring/Summer 2003
than on participation. Participation is treated more as an intervening variable in the process of
intergenerational transmission of political orientations than as a dependent variable in its own right:
active parents are more likely to pass on their political preferences to their offspring than are less active
parents. More recently, important work uses longitudinal socialization studies to focus on the transmis-
sion of activity. See Jennings and Stoker (2001); and Campbell (2002).
8. See, for example, Greenstein (1965, chap. 5); Hess and Torney (1967, chaps. 5, 7); Chaffee, McLeod, and
Wackman (1973); Jaros (1973, p.83); and Sigel and Brookes (1974, pp. 120–122).
9. In an article that focuses on the role of personality development in political socialization, Stanley Renshon
(1975, pp. 47–50) comes close to suggesting this alternative mechanism for the translation of SES advan-
tage into participatory advantage across generations. Without mentioning educational opportunities per
se, he argues (p. 48) that SES is “a shorthand for a whole range of life and developmental experiences,
attitudes, and life-styles” and that a child who is born into a high SES family has the advantage of an
“expanding choice system.”
10. For an account of the factors that foster political activity and, in particular, the participatory conse-
quences of educational attainment, see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, chap. 15). An additional
reason for paying special attention to education is that we have better measures of parental education than
of the other socio-economic characteristics of the family of origin.
11. For a discussion of politically relevant categories from the point of view of the representation of political
interests, see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, chap. 6). We should also note that political activity
depends heavily on political mobilization and the channels of mobilization are often group specific. See
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993); and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995).
12. We use data from the Citizen Participation Study, which was conducted in 1990. For wording of all
questions and information about the survey, the oversamples of Latinos, African Americans, and those
who are active in politics, and the characteristics that allow it to be treated as a national random sample,
see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, Appendixes A and B). Because we are concerned with
intergenerational processes, we considered using the Jennings and Niemi data, which have the unambigu-
ous advantage of multiple studies of the same individuals over time. However, the oversamples of Latinos
and African Americans in the Citizen Participation sample and the measures of civic skills and recruit-
ment in the questionnaire make these data more appropriate for the questions we ask here.
13. The bivariate correlation between a scale of parental political involvement and respondent’s activity is .20
(p<.001). For details about the variables used in this paper, see Appendix B.
14. We were concerned that the relationship between early exposure to politics at home and adult participa-
tion represented backward projection—with memories of the past colored by current commitments. Data
about gender differences presented in Table 4 cast doubt on this interpretation. See footnote 30 and Table 4.
15. The bivariate correlation is .43 (p<.001). Because educational attainment is so deeply influenced by birth
cohort, here and elsewhere, we have corrected the measure of parents’ education for age. See Appendix B.
16. The bivariate correlation is .26 (p<.001).
17. For the measures of skills and requests for activity, see Appendix B.
18. With these factors taken into account, neither being African American nor being Latino is significantly
associated with political activity. However, there is a small, though significant, relationship between par-
ticipation and being male.
19. For details of this analysis, see Appendix B. Our work draws on and parallels the analyses of the effects of
parents’ education on status attainment in the literature on social mobility. (See, for example, Blau and
Duncan, 1967). These early models made clear that “education is . . . the main vehicle of social reproduc-
tion” (Ganzeboom, Treiman and Ultee , 1991, p. 284). We modify these earlier analyses by expanding the
model to include women and incorporating mothers’ educational level among the explanatory factors.
20. Until 1976 the National Election Studies asked about parents’ levels of political interest. We used these data
to explore the parental legacy of political involvement with results consistent with those presented here.
21. We assume that these additional effects reflect the operation of the unmeasured processes discussed earlier
as well as the measurement error in our measures—in particular, the scale measuring home political
environment.
22. The impact on contributions that we are assigning to parents’ education could well be the result of their
income, which is, of course, associated with their education. Unfortunately, the questionnaire included
no information about parents’ income.
23. See Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, Chapter 6) and Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, (2001). The mean
scores on the eight item scale are: Men 2.3, women 2.0 (Diff. sig .00); Anglo-Whites 2.1, African
Americans 1.9; Latinos 1.2 (Diffs. between Anglo-Whites and the other two groups sig. .00).
24. Charles Tilly (1998, p. 6) makes clear that what he calls bounded categories deserve special attentionVerba, Burns, and Schlozman 61
because they provide clearer evidence for the operation of durable inequality, because their boundaries do
crucial organizational work, and because categorical differences actually account for much of what
ordinary observers take to be results of variation in individual talent or effort. On the importance of
paying attention to categorical differences, see also Young (1994).
25. For earlier examples using outcomes analysis, see Stokes, Campbell, and Miller (1958) and Gilens (1988).
26. As in Table 1, parental education in measured as the age-adjusted average of mother’s and father’s educa-
tional attainment and home political environment is a scale composed of mother’s and father’s level of
political activity and the frequency of political discussion at home at age 16. In Table 4, these scales, along
with respondent’s education and political activity, have been rescaled to vary from 0 to 1.
27. Data from the General Social Survey, which include more precise information about the educational
attainment of each parent, show that the difference between Whites and Blacks is a bit under three years
of schooling (averaged for both parents) and between Anglo Whites and Latinos about five years.
28. Calculated from: census.gov/population/socdemo/education/table A–2.txt. Interpreting the narrowing
of the educational gap requires caution. A higher proportion of African-American students than white
students receive a GED which may have less educational value, and the quality of education may differ
from one group to another with the increase in high school completion more often a function of social
promotion (Jencks, 1992).
29. There are no comparable data for 1940. The decrease in the ratio is likely the result of recent immigration
patterns that have changed the class composition of the Latino population.
30. The reports by men and women respondents about their parents’ educational attainment and political
involvement lend credence to our claim that these retrospective reports are not unduly contaminated by
adult experience. If respondents were projecting backward, we would expect the advantage of male re-
spondents with respect to both educational attainment and political participation to result in recollec-
tions of higher levels of educational attainment and political involvement for the parents of male respon-
dents. Instead we find no differences in the reported educational level or political involvement of the
parents of male and female respondents, a result consistent with the fact that women and men are born
randomly into all kinds of families.
31. As noted previously, these variables have been rescaled to vary between 0 and 1.
32. These equations include controls for age. In addition, the equations for men and women include controls
for race or ethnicity, and the equations for Anglo Whites, African Americans, and Latinos contain con-
trols for gender.
We have replicated these results with single-equation models and interaction terms for the groups we
consider here. The results of those analyses yield conclusions identical to the conclusions we draw here.
See Appendix A for these results. In the tables we report in the body of this paper, we use t-tests to assess
the difference between the coefficients for the two groups. By these tests, none of these coefficients differ
across groups. The same is true in the interactive models. We chose to use split samples here enable the
reader to see the possibility of difference even more clearly than one would see it in an interactive model.
33. Although the difference between the coefficients for African Americans and Anglo Whites is not statisti-
cally significant, it is sufficiently large that we would expect to find substantive differences in larger
samples. Longitudinal analysis of the association between the educational attainment of parents and their
offspring shows the relationship seems to be stable for Whites but—reflecting the strides in educational
attainment among Blacks in recent decades—a diminishing one for African Americans. See Jencks (1992,
pp. 175–176).
On longitudinal changes in the intergenerational transmission of education for various groups, see
Featherman and Hauser (1976a, 1976b, 1978); Hauser and Featherman (1977); Corcoran (1995).
34. See Appendix B for details of these calculations.
35. We calculated these effects exactly as we did in Table 2. See also Appendix B.
36. Using separate OLS regressions for each of the five groups and controlling for respondent’s education,
political exposure at home, and age, we find only one case in which there is a significant coefficient for
parents’ education. For women, higher levels of parental education decrease women’s exposure to recruit-
ment requests, a result that puzzles us. In this case, the effect of parents’ education is to widen the gender
gap with respect to an important participatory factor.
It is important to recognize that the figures in Table 6 do not tell the whole story of how group
differences in participatory factors are created by differential processes of selection into and treatment in
non-political institutions. Instead, they pertain only to that part of the group difference that results from
the various effects of parents’ education.
To reduce the amount of data we need to present, we have truncated the analysis somewhat. The
acquisition of participatory factors in non-political institutions involves two stages: the process by which62 The American Sociologist / Spring/Summer 2003
individuals choose to affiliate with an institution and the experiences individuals have once they are in the
institution. While we have conducted these more elaborate analyses elsewhere, we chose to use a stream-
lined approach in this paper because of the number of groups we are considering.
37. See Appendix B for an explanation of the method used here.
38. To the extent possible, we replicated these analyses using the National Black Election Study and the
Latino National Election Study with results consistent with those presented here. We also replicated the
analysis using time-based acts and political contributions as dependent variables. For all five groups,
parents’ education has an impact on family income, above and beyond its impact on respondent’s educa-
tion, and for all five groups family income is overwhelmingly important in explaining political contribu-
tions. Thus, we confirm for women and men and for Latinos, African Americans, and Anglo Whites the
earlier analysis showing multiple streams of influence of parental legacy.
In addition, in order to circumvent the oversimplification of assuming that men and women of the
three race and ethnic groups (or that Whites or Blacks or Latinos of either sex) are essentially the same, we
replicated this analysis for the six groups at the intersection of gender and race or ethnicity: Latinas,
Latinos, African American women, African American men, Anglo-White women, and Anglo-White men.
Our results were unchanged. While there are important differences among groups defined by their race or
ethnicity in the role played by intergenerational transmission, there are no important differences in these
processes for the men and women within any racial or ethnic group.
39. There might be other familial effects that are different for girls and boys, for which we do not have
measures. For example, boys may receive different socialization cues about proper activities in later life.
40. As mentioned earlier, we have focused exclusively on parents’ education because we have no information
about their incomes or occupations. We would surmise that better information about these and other
manifestations of class background would have strengthened our argument.
41. See Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) for a full account of these processes.
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Appendix A
Interactive models, of course, generate the same results as the separate models we use
in our analyses. To satisfy readers on this point, we present the interactive models in this
appendix. We prefer the models separating the groups so that we do not give undue
weight to the largest group in our sample—Anglo Whites.
A. Interactive model predicting respondent’s education on the basis of parent’s
education, controlling for age. Parallel to Table 5A.
Variable Coefficient Standard error
Parents’ education .72*** .05
White women*
Parents’ education -.02 .06
African-American men*
Parents’ education -.22 .19
African-American women*
Parents’ education -.07 .15
Latino*
Parents’ education -.11 .22
Latina*
Parents’ education .10 .19
White women -.01 .02
African-American men -.01 .004
African-American women -.06* .03
Latino -.06 .05
Latina -.17*** .04
Age -.07*** .02
Age over 65 -.11*** .02
Constant .55*** .02
Adjusted R-squared .26
N 2515
* p<.05
** p<.01
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B. Interactive model predicting parents’ political discussion and political activity
on the basis of parents’ education, controlling for age. Parallel to Table 5B.
Variable Coefficient Standard error
Parents’ education .30*** .04
White women*
Parents’ education .03 .05
African-American men*
Parents’ education .10 .15
African-American women*
Parents’ education .06 .12
Latino*
Parents’ education -.06 .18
Latina*
Parents’ education .16 .16
White women -.00 .01
African-American men .01 .03
African-American women .003 .03
Latino .002 .04
Latina -.06* .03
Age .02 .02
Age over 65 .02 .02
Constant .16*** .01
Adjusted R-squared .07
N 2515
* p<.05
** p<.01
*** p<.00166 The American Sociologist / Spring/Summer 2003
Appendix B
Data, Measures, and Method
Data
We use data from the Citizen Participation Study, which was conducted in 1990. For
wording of all questions and for additional information about the survey, its oversamples of
Latinos and African-Americans, its oversamples of those who are active in politics, and the
characteristics that allow it to be treated as a national random sample, see Verba, Schlozman,
and Brady (1995, Appendixes A and B).
Measures
Activity. Throughout the paper we measure political activity by an eight-point summary
scale that includes the following political acts: voting; working in a campaign; contributing
to a campaign; contacting an official; taking part in a protest, march, or demonstration;
being affiliated with an organization that takes stands in politics; being active in the local
community; and serving as a volunteer on a local board.
The scale has a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.60. The individual items in the scale are weakly
correlated: the average correlation between the items is .17. Thus, while the realized distri-
bution does not appear to be perfectly Normally distributed, the realized distribution and
the pattern of correlations reassure us that an ordinary least squares regression is the appro-
priate technique to use. This technique is, of course, especially useful because of its robust-
ness. Small changes in data and specification do not yield different results as they might
with less robust methods. For a sense of the consequences of these small correlations for
the distribution of the data, we used three variables that were more strongly correlated
than others in the scale: informal local activity, organizational involvement, and con-
tributing money to campaigns. We calculated what percentage of our respondents would
have done two or more of these three acts had these acts been completely independent
of one another. If these acts had been independent of one another, 25% of the sample
would have engaged in two or more of these three acts. In our data, with the small
correlations between acts, 26% of our sample participated in two or more of these acts.
The full distribution of the variable in our data is
Number of Acts Percentage of Respondents
0 17 %
1 26
2 20
3 17
4 11
56
62
71
8 0.1
These are not, then, especially rare or especially correlated events; therefore, a Poisson or
Negative Binomial specification would be inappropriate here.Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 67
Explanatory variables. In order to facilitate comparisons across different independent
variables that are measured in different metrics and that have different ranges, in Table
1 and other multivariate analyses we have transformed the independent variables to
have a range from 0 to 1.
Politics at home. We measure exposure to politics at home as the sum of the respondent’s
mother’s political activity, the respondent’s father’s political activity, and the level of politi-
cal discussion at home when the respondent was 16 years old and divide respondents into
quartiles based on this scale. For each quartile, we show the proportion who undertook at
least one of the seven political activities other than voting.
Parents’ education. We measure parents’ education as the average of the respondent’s re-
port of mother’s education and father’s education. There are missing data on parents’ educa-
tion and on the variables that compose politics at home. We worked extensively with these
measures to ensure that using the average value to fill the missings does not change the
results in any way. This is the appropriate place to fill these missing data. In addition, one
might think that we should use the highest educated parent’s education as our measure of
parents’ education. We think not. First, the results using both measures are identical. Sec-
ond, standard measurement theory suggests that two measures deal with measurement error
better than one, and so we rely on the average here.
For our comparisons to be informative, we need to take account of the fact that older
parental generations have, on average, lower levels of education than younger ones do. To
address that complication, throughout our analysis, we use an age-adjusted measure of pa-
rental education that measures the respondent’s parents’ education relative to the average
educational level at the time. Thus, the assignment into quintiles reflects both the average of
mother’s and father’s education and the educational distribution in the parental age cohort.
Civic skills. We measured civic skills by asking whether, in the past six months, the re-
spondent wrote a letter, went to a meeting where she took part in making decisions, planned
or chaired a meeting, or gave a presentation or speech in three separate adult institutions:
the workplace, religious institutions, and non-political organizations. We asked these ques-
tions separately for each institution. The variable we use is the sum of the number of skills
practiced in these three institutions.
Institutional recruitment. Similarly, our measure of requests for political activity is about
requests originating in each of these three non-political institutions. We asked whether, in
the last five years, the respondent was asked by the organization or its leaders, by the reli-
gious institution or its leaders, the workplace or the respondent’s superiors to vote for or
against certain candidates in an election for public office or take some other action on a
local or national political issue—sign a petition, write a letter, go to a meeting, attend a
protest or march, or get in touch with a public official. The measure of recruitment sums
these requests across these three institutions.
Age. We have included two variables measuring age—the age in decades and whether
the respondent is older than 65—as controls. This accounts for the curvilinear relation-
ship of age to participation in a way that’s easier on the reader than the squared terms
that generate a parabolic specification.
Method
Table 2. We calculate the effects of parental education by multiplying the effects of
parental education on intervening variables in the chain of analyses by the effects of these
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analysis here, we prefer the increased amount of information available through the pro-
cedure we use here. We are especially keen to keep the actual units of our variables in
plain view. Our method does that, while path analysis, with its reliance on standardiza-
tion, does not.
To calculate the first five rows in the table, we estimated multivariate models of the
impact of parents’ education on politics at home, respondent’s education, family income,
civic skills, and recruitment. We multiplied the average level of parents’ education by the
coefficients on parents’ education in those models to arrive at the amount of these variables
due directly to parents’ education. On average, respondents receive a direct boost of .07
to politics at home, .15 to education, .03 to family income, .04 to civic skills, and .01
to recruitment from their parents’ education. We took those levels of skills and the like
that were consequences of parents’ education and multiplied them by the coefficients
on those variables in Table 1 to calculate the indirect effect of parents’ education on
respondent’s levels of participation via these five variables. For example, respondents
receive an average boost to their own education of about .15 (on the 0 to 1 education
scale) from their parents’ education. We multiplied that .15 by the coefficient on edu-
cation in the participation equation we reported in Table 1 (1.32) to arrive at an effect
of .20 acts of participation resulting from the impact of parents’ education on participa-
tion respondent’s education.
To calculate the additional effects of parents’ education (that is, the effects not operating
through the paths we just outlined), we multiplied the average level of parents’ education
(.22 on a 0–1 scale) by the coefficient on parents’ education in Table 1 (.22   .61) to arrive
at an additional effect of parents’ education on adult political participation of .13 acts. This
number represents the average additional effect of parents’ education.
Table 5. Where there is no statistically significant difference between the groups in either
the level or the effect, we use the average for both groups in calculating these products.
Thus, in Table 5A, we use different levels (.23 and .13), but the same effect ((.5*(.71 + .75))
= .73) to show—for Anglo Whites and Latinos respectively—the consequences of parents’
education for respondent’s education. This strategy avoids privileging the largest group—
Anglo Whites—in defining the average, as we would do if we simply calculated the average
for the entire sample as an interactive model would do.
Table 6. We calculated these effects exactly as we did in Table 2.
To calculate the effects of parents’ education, we combined our earlier analyses of the
impact of parents’ education on respondent’s education and on politics at home. We paired
the results of those earlier outcomes analyses— which made clear the precise consequences
of parents’ education for education and politics at home—with the coefficients in the equa-
tions predicting skills, recruitment, and family income. We first calculated the parts of the
respondent’s education and politics at home due to parents’ education. Then, we took
the part of education and politics at home due to parents’ education and multiplied
that by the coefficients on these two variables in the equations predicting civic skills,
recruitment, and family income. The consequence was the boost in civic skills, recruit-
ment, and family income that comes directly from the increases in politics at home and
respondent’s education that are due to parent’s education. The notion, then, is that
parent’s education works indirectly—by creating education and politics at home—to
generate skills, recruitment, and family income. The numbers we report here are the
differences in the results of this process for the groups in question.
To calculate the additional effects of parents’ education, we first estimated equations
predicting civic skills, recruitment, and family income. These equations included parents’
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aged children, age, age over 65, gender, race, and ethnicity. We estimated these equa-
tions separately for women, men, Anglo Whites, African Americans, and Latinos. With
the coefficients on parents’ education in hand, we could calculate the direct effect of
parents’ education exactly as we did in the outcomes analyses we reported earlier. That
is, we multiplied the coefficients on parents’ education by the average level of parents’
education for the group to yield the amount of theresource due to parents’ education.
Then we calculated the differences in these amounts of resources for the groups we
examine here.
The results reported in Table 6 suggest that parents’ education works to shape group
differences indirectly, by affecting respondent’s education and politics at home first.
Table 7. To calculate the numbers in Table 7, we extended the method used in Tables 2
and 6. First, we estimated equations predicting respondents’ education, politics at home,
family income, civic skills, and recruitment. Then, we used the coefficients from these mod-
els, in conjunction with the average level of parents’ education to which the group had
access, to calculate the predicted amount of education, politics at home, family income,
civic skills, and recruitment due to parents’ education. At that point, we had in hand the
level of each of the participatory factors to which each of the five groups had access as a
consequence of parents’ education. We then estimated an equation predicting political par-
ticipation. That equation yielded the coefficients to multiply by the levels of the factors due
to parents’ education. We, then, multiplied the two; the result was the amount of participa-
tion due to a particular path through which parents’ education comes to shape respondents’
political activity. Once we had that result, we calculated the net contribution to the gap in
political action created through that path.